



**REVIEW OF RER-14/0019 PROJECT: “BUILDING
INTEGRITY KAPASITETBYGGING I
FORSVARSEKTOREN”. CASE NO. 17/4940**

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Acronyms

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BiHMoD	Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Defence
CDCAF	Center for the Democratic Control of Arm Forces
CIDS	Center for Integrity in the Defence Sector
CSO	Civil society organizations
Difi	Norwegian Agency of Public Management and e-Government
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
GG	Governance Group
IPA	Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance of the European Union
MKSF	Ministry for Kosovo Security Forces
MMoD	Montenegrin Ministry of Defence
MMoI	Montenegrin Ministry of Interior
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMFA	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NMoD	Norwegian Ministry of Defence
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PAR	Public Administration Reform
RAI	Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative
RESPA	Regional School for Public Administration
SSA	Stabilisation and Association Agreement
ToR	Terms of Reference
WB	Western Balkan

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The **Integrity project**, which is a complex, multifaceted and multi-country project, has been a **success** by most measures. The project is **meticulously** designed, demand driven, locally owned, evidence-based and uses a participatory approach. The project embraces a **holistic** approach in that it recognizes the issue of integrity as part of broader public administration reforms. The project is in alignment with the EU mid-term *Enlargement Strategy 2015-2019*, which made public administration reform one of its top priorities; this gives the project additional **political** leverage. The **composition** of the CIDS project team is mindful of the cultural context and recognizes the multiple benefits of local and regional experts taking the lead in project implementation, with sound Norwegian expert support. The required commitment, sophistication and competence of the respective beneficiaries' project teams (ministries of defence/security) is very **high**; there is a strong sense of **pride** among project team members. The level of beneficiary **satisfaction** with the project is also very **high**; the project is praised for its design, targeted assistance and flexibility, as well as the expertise provided. The feedback from other **donors** supporting the defence and security sectors about the project is **overwhelmingly** positive, not least because the project has been successful in timely mapping out key donors in those sectors and ensuring proper coordination of activities.

Perhaps the greatest accomplishment of the **project** thus far is that it has significantly increased the understanding of the concept of **integrity** among the beneficiary. Given that integrity is part of the EU and NATO reform agenda in the beneficiary countries, it can be argued that the pioneering work of the CIDS project in this area has **facilitated** the **EU** and **NATO** reforms towards that end. While the project is still in the implementing phase, there is already a number of specific project **outcomes** which the report has identified (Table 2, 4, 6); this attests to the sound project design methodology. The project activities are largely proceeding as planned.

There are some weaknesses with the project including a lack of strategy or targeted interventions on **gender**. The **visibility** and **outreach** of the project is **poor** and needs to be improved. There is no overarching **project document** and **results framework** for the 4 sub-projects. This has led to some **administrative and reporting challenges** between the Norwegian MFA (grantor) and Norwegian MoD/CIDS (grantee). At the country level the reporting needs to move from **process to results reporting**.

In order to maximise the lasting impact and sustainability of the project, we **recommend**:

- **Consider an extension of the project:** Integrity reforms are a complex undertaking: they take, time, resources, commitment and expertise of the parties involved – as well as public support. The project is now entering its **critical** phase. It is expected that the work on the necessary legal framework will largely be completed by the end of this project cycle. However, critical for the lasting impact of the project will be the **implementation** of the new integrity framework in place. This would require ongoing and targeted **capacity** building efforts over a significant period of time. Otherwise, there is the perceived **danger** that the project will not fully realize its goals and objectives, and achieve lasting **sustainability**. In addition, without **ongoing** capacity

building efforts, there is a **high** probability of **back sliding** of the progress made. Integrity reforms target powerful interests in the government and require significant **changes** in behavior. Without sustained and coordinated efforts of all parties involved, the achieved progress can easily be **reversed**.

- There are a number of **lessons learned**, which need to be duly incorporated if there is a project extension:
- **Improve the project document and internal project administration:** the current project consists of one grant with multiple mini-project documents. There should be one unified project document with corresponding results framework, goal hierarchy and risk assessment. A concise project document, in line with Norad guidance¹, comprised of clear reporting requirements and a results framework is likely to improve the administrative cooperation between NMFA and NMoD.
 - **Increase political coordination:** There is a perceived need for more regular meetings between the Norwegian Ministry of Defence high-ranking representatives and their counterparts in the beneficiary countries; this would increase both the leverage of the project as well as the beneficiary project team among the beneficiary top leadership (*infra*, 4.1.2., 4.2.2.)
 - **Consider establishing the project coordination board in Kosovo and Montenegro.** As the review suggests, the experience with the project coordination board in Bosnia and Hercegovina has been positive and is worth considering with respect to the other two beneficiaries (*infra*, 2. 4.2.2.)
 - **Ensure continued donor coordination.** Given that public administration reform is a top priority for the EU enlargement process, significant EU funding as well as bilateral assistance is expected to be designated for that purpose in the coming period, which needs to be coordinated with the project.
 - **Prepare a contingency plan.** There have been some deviations from the agreed activity time table, in particular with respect to the planned activities which require prior legislative changes which are outside of the jurisdiction of the beneficiary (the respective ministries). Depending on the prospect of those changes to come to fruition any time soon, this might require developing contingency plans for the project implementation.
 - **Prepare a sustainability and utilization plan.** The beneficiary needs to present a clear plan as to how the lasting sustainability of the project will be ensured, as well as how it plans to utilize the project experience for embarking on related reforms.
 - **Ensure institutional coordination and sharing.** Given that integrity is part of a broader public administration reform, the beneficiary needs to present a plan as to how the necessary coordination among the line ministries and institutions will be ensured – as well as how they plan to share the project’s lessons learned with other line ministries and institutions (ombudsperson, anti-corruption agencies, etc.).
 - Develop a **gender approach** to the project; how can gender gaps associated with the defence and security sectors be addressed by the project in the target countries? An

¹ <https://www.norad.no/om-bistand/publikasjon/2009/results-management-in-norwegian-development-cooperation--a-practical-guide/>

example of this is the Montenegrin Ministry of Interior, which is developing a Gender Action Plan, to increase number of women in the police.

- **Prepare a visibility and outreach plan.** Overall, there is need to increase the visibility and outreach of the project. Integrity reforms, as part of public administration reforms, are ultimately about citizens and for citizens. That message needs to be communicated to the public clearly. This would conceivably garner public support for the reform issues and help minimize the risk of political obstruction of the reforms, and hence the project implementation.
 - **Reporting procedures.** Reporting on the projects' implementation needs to move from process to results. For future phases, the number of trainings held as currently reported is irrelevant – there is a need to see the results of such trainings (e.g. number of complaints related to recruitment and procurement dropped; number of female and minority recruits increased; regional representation balanced, etc.).
 - **Strengthen collaboration with CSO and academia.** Overall, there is a need for increased collaboration with CSOs on the project. CSOs may be an important additional source of information pertinent to project implementation as well as a powerful ally in monitoring and advocating for the integrity reforms. To the extent possible, there is also a need to engage academia in the project implementation.
- There are a number of the perceived general risks which might impact a decision on project extension. **Political risk** exists due to the unstable political environment and deeply fractioned society in the beneficiary countries. In addition, there is the perceived risk of change in the **leadership** of the beneficiary **project team** as well as the **CIDS project** team. However, as Table 7 indicates, the perceived risks are **low** or can be **mitigated**. These risks and mitigating measures should be clearly outlined in a new project document (if the project is to be extended).

1. Introduction

The Governance Group –TGG (Oslo, Norway) was commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA) to carry out a review of the preliminary results of project RER-14/0019 (“Building integrity, kapasitetsbygging i forsvarssektoren”). The Terms of Reference (TOR, Appendix IV) states that the overall goal of the project is to strengthen integrity and reduce vulnerability to corruption in the defence and security sectors in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Montenegro and Kosovo. More precisely, the project aims to improve administrative routines and regulations, enhance openness, reduce vulnerability to conflicts of interests, establish better systems for risk assessments, and build competence and capacity among civil servants in the selected countries. The agreement partner and implementing partner is the Norwegian Ministry of Defence (NMoD), through its Center for Integrity in the Defence Sector (CIDS).

The 4 sub-projects of RER-14/0019 are the following:

- *Kosovo 1*: Strengthening the integrity framework in the Ministry of Kosovo Security Forces (MKSF).
- *Kosovo 2*: Support to capacity development in the MKSF.
- *Montenegro*: Strengthening the integrity framework in security and defence sectors.
- *BiH*: Support to the procurement system in the Ministry of Defence (BiH MD).

The TOR further calls for the review to identify, if possible, and describe changes to laws, regulations and administrative routines that are a direct result of the project implementation, applying the DAC review criteria with respect to the *relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact* and *sustainability* of the project. It dully acknowledges however that “improvements may not occur until after the project period has expired and the projects are part of the broader efforts by the international community. These factors need to be taken into consideration when reviewing the projects” (TOR, p. 3.). In light of this, and given that the project is still **ongoing**, the report could only provide the **initial assessment** on the fulfilment of the DAC review criteria.

This report has been prepared based on the following method and key activities as per the TOR:

- Desk study of relevant background documents: this *inter alia* included the entire project documentation (project documents, progress reports, evaluations from seminars, trainings and workshop).
- Inception meeting with NMFA in Oslo.
- Interviews with the NMoD and CIDS in Oslo.
- Field visits to Podgorica (Montenegro), Sarajevo (BiH), and Prishtina (Kosovo) and meetings with key personnel in the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior (Montenegro), Ministry of Defence (BiH), and the Ministry for the Kosovo Security Forces, all of whom are responsible for the Integrity project’s implementation (Appendix I).
- Meetings with the Norwegian embassies/ambassadors in Pristina and Sarajevo.
- Meetings with the CIDS Project Team and national Team Leaders

Interviews with the relevant ministries (project beneficiaries) were conducted based on tailored and semi-structured questionnaires. These were provided in advance of the meetings thus enabling the review team to cross-check the information received in person (Appendix II). The range of meetings we held ensured the triangulation of data. Depending on country-specific circumstances, interviews

involved the beneficiary (government officials), the NATO liaison offices, donors, civil society organizations (CSOs) and independent security experts.

The structure of the report follows the outline of the TOR. Chapter 2 provides a review of the CIDS project structure as it impacts on project implementation. Chapter 3 then reviews the CIDS methodology as it impacts on the outcome and output of the project. Chapter 4 provides a review of the (sub) projects in the three countries concerned. The country-specific analyses begin with a brief outline of the larger policy context in each given country which may impact on the outcome of the project against the background of the EU integration process. This chapter then further summarises the feedback gained from the beneficiaries and other stakeholders during the field visit. A review of country-specific project results (including changes in laws, regulations and administrative routines) is presented in tables, against the background of the (sub) projects specific objectives. It highlights that the **output (impact)** of the project is already **visible, despite the ongoing nature of the project**. Chapter 5 provides general conclusions and recommendations, duly incorporating the feedback and recommendations received from the beneficiaries. A risk analysis of the major general risks which may impact the decision of project extension are also included in this concluding chapter.

2. Project Management Set Up

The project management set up is simple and straightforward. The project is implemented by CIDS, which is the organizational semi-independent unit of the NMoD. The Director of CIDS has the overall responsibility for the project implementation and therefore has the functional role of 'Project Director'. The Project Director is supported by a 'Deputy Project Director who is responsible for administrative and contractual matters. An Associate Expert, who was seconded to CIDS from the Norwegian Agency of Public Management and e-Government (Difi), and has substantial experience in government capacity building programs in the Western Balkans, acts as 'Senior Adviser' on the project, advising both the CIDS and the beneficiaries on substantial issues at hand. The Associate Expert regularly communicates to the Director of CIDS on issues pertinent to project implementation, including those which are deemed contentious and politically sensitive (*infra*, Chapter 4.2.2.). He pays regular visits to the beneficiary countries and meets with the national team leaders and regional experts. National team leaders are responsible for project coordination with beneficiaries in their respective countries. A team of two regional experts in human resources management and public procurements, respectively, has lead responsibilities in providing technical assistance to the beneficiaries on those issues as well as ensuring regional information and lessons learned are shared. There are a number of Norwegian experts participating in project implementation on a needs/demand basis.

The project does not have a steering committee, given the targeted assistance and a small number of beneficiaries (ministries of defence/security). As a norm, a project steering committee is deemed useful when there is a greater number of beneficiaries as well as donors with diverse roles and responsibilities on a project. There is, however, the Coordination Board for the project in BiH which is composed of the CIDS Associate Expert and two staffers with the BiH MoD who lead the Ministry's project team (Assistant to the Minister and Head of the Procurement Department). The Board facilitates the process of strategic planning and coordination of project activities between the CIDS and MoD, and regularly meets with the Minister to brief him on the progress made. We received positive feedback from the members of the Board about its functioning. Notably, the project organization has played a constructive role in diffusing tensions between the Minister and his Assistant, the head of the MoD project team, with

respect to the project activities (the CIDS functional analyses of the MoD procurement set up) which the Minister felt unfavourably exposed the Ministry (*infra*, Chapter 4.2.2.).

The project is low risk with regard to administration and implementation: funding is provided by the NMFA and runs through MoD/CIDS with no grants passed on to local partners. Although there has been some delay in financial transfers between the departments it has not impacted the project. The set-up is essentially a government to government grant subject to the auditor general (*Riksrevisjonen*), and hence there is little room for project corruption or malfeasance. Quality assurance is secured through regular communications and meetings between NMFA and MoD. MoD/CIDS, in turn, has regular contact with beneficiaries both through HQ and the CIDS country project teams.

3. CIDS Project Methodology

Based on the review of project documentation, the information received from the CIDS Project Team, the project beneficiaries in the countries concerned, as well as other parties, there are several aspects of the CIDS project methodology that stand out:

- **Demand driven and participatory process:** Following the initial expression of interest by the beneficiaries, intensive consultations between the beneficiaries and CIDS as well as an analysis of the institutional risk factors and a needs assessment² took place. This process enabled both parties to better understand the pressing needs on the ground and develop a common vision as to how the project could best respond to address those needs. In addition, these consultations helped forge a productive relationship based on mutual trust and understanding.
- **Holistic understanding of the reforms:** CIDS has excellent access to, trust and network in order to work with the defence sector in the countries concerned. Project documentation was prepared based on CIDS understanding that integrity in the ministry of defence/security is an integral part of *public administration reforms* (PAR), rather than a stand-alone project. As a result, the general goals and priorities of the PAR are fully incorporated and reflected in the project documents. This is particularly significant, given that a lack of donors' holistic understanding of the reforms they support has been recognized as a major challenge facing foreign assistance in the Western Balkans and beyond. This often results in overlapping and poorly articulated and implemented projects, which have insignificant, if not adverse, impacts. The CIDS holistic approach to the project is also in alignment with the EU mid-term *Enlargement Strategy 2015-2019* which made public administration reform one of top priorities for the WB countries.³ This further increased the leverage of the project among the beneficiaries.
- **Evidence based approach:** Project documentation is based on thoroughly prepared regional and country specific analyses of the institutional risk factors and needs assessment in building integrity. This included the review of relevant laws and strategic documents, engagement of local experts, preparation of an extensive questionnaire, interviews and consultations with key stakeholders, as well as country specific recommendations.⁴ The analyses are then adopted by the respective governments. This facilitated the process of drafting the project proposal as

² The institutional risk factors and needs assessment analyses was prepared by the Difi.

³ COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS: EU Enlargement Strategy, Brussels, 10.11.2015 COM(2015) 611 final, pp. 2, 5, 9.

targeted, sector specific support in which project activities correspond with the project goals, and are timely and cost-effective.

- **Local ownership:** The project documents make it clear that the beneficiary is also the key implementer of the project, with CIDS providing the necessary technical assistance. This has led to the beneficiary being increasingly assertive of its ownership as the project implementation has progressed. Along with the participatory process, holistic understanding, and the evidence based approach, local ownership has ensured the observation of the DAC criteria in project preparation and implementation (*relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability*).
- **Composition of the project team:** The composition of the project team is a blend of regional, national and international experts, with Norwegian “soft hand” management. It showcases that CIDS is mindful of the cultural context and understands the ensuing benefits of having experts speaking local languages taking the lead in project implementation (including timely and unfettered communication with the beneficiaries). The qualifications of national team leaders ensure that the project is run smoothly: experts with PhDs in relevant fields and a PhD candidate manage the project in Kosovo, BiH and Montenegro, respectively. National team leaders are the focal point of communication with the beneficiary. They also provide CIDS with valuable expert feedback on the design and implementation of project activities and serve as an ‘information feeder’ for CIDS. This ensures that the project is adaptable to the evolving circumstances on the ground.

It is the project methodology as well as the commitment and expertise of CIDS staff that can be credited for the **beneficiary’s very high level of satisfaction** with cooperation in the design and implementation of the project. The level of satisfaction can also be attributed to the fact that this kind of comprehensive technical assistance in the defence and security sector is relatively **rare**, relative to the perceived needs. During the field visit the review team could only identify NATO liaison offices in BiH and Kosovo who provide a similar type of assistance. In Kosovo, the level of the beneficiary’s satisfaction with the CIDS assistance is **significantly higher** than the one provided by the NATO liaison office, which is leading reforms in the defence sectors. The official requests for project extension put forward by the beneficiaries in the three countries to the NMFA attests to their satisfaction with CIDS services, as well as the recognition of the significance of the concept of integrity for their overall reform efforts.

4. Country Specific Sub-projects

4.1 Montenegro

4.1.1. General background

Montenegro opened negotiations on its accession to the EU in June 2012. As of June 2017, 28 out of 35 negotiation chapters have been opened, while 3 chapters have been temporarily closed. By this measure, Montenegro has significantly outpaced other candidate countries for the EU membership. However, while being a ‘good student’ in negotiations, formidable reform challenges persists. The **institutional** framework for **integrity** includes: the parliamentary committee for security and defence; the Council for citizens control of the police; the Ombudsperson; the Agency for the Protection of Personal Data and Access to Information of Public Utility; the Anti-Corruption Agency; and the Commission for the Prevention of Conflicts of Interests.

As for the **legal** and **policy** framework governing **integrity**, the new Law on Administrative Procedure was enacted in 2016. The amendments to the Public Procurement Law were enacted in June 2017 (allowing exception from the application of the procurement rules for the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior). The Law on the Prevention of Corruption obliges state authorities to adopt the **integrity plan** until the end of March 2016 and submit it to the Agency for Anti-Corruption; it also provides safeguards for the protection of whistle blowers. The Strategy of Public Administration Reform 2016-2020 was adopted and envisages further strengthening of the framework for the **integrity of civil servants** as well as **public procurement** as strategic priorities. In addition to the EU negotiations, this progress can largely be credited to the negotiations for NATO membership, which were successfully concluded in June 2017 and were a top foreign priority for Montenegro. There is no doubt, however, that the **CIDS project** has significantly **contributed** to the such **progress**. Indeed, in recognition of its services, the CIDS technical assistance has **exceeded** the scope envisaged by the project: at the request of the newly formed Ministry of Public Administration, CIDS also provided assistance in drafting the 2016 Law on Administrative Procedures as well as the draft amendments to the Law on Civil Servants and State Employees (*infra*, 4.1.3. Table 2).

The 2016 **EC Communication on EU Enlargement Policy** notes progress in Montenegro in strengthening the framework for tackling **corruption** and organised crime, including the establishment of the **Anti-Corruption Agency**. It also notes substantial efforts deployed to foster specialisation, both in the police and within the judiciary.⁵ The Communication also notes a number of challenges with respect to PAR which pertains to Montenegro as well as other WB countries – and might have a direct impact on the **CIDS project**. These include a complex and costly administrative structure, and the frequent use of exceptions, especially for appointments and dismissals of senior civil servants. In addition, the quality of policy-making and legal drafting is not in line with the approach of the EU Better Regulation Agenda. Legislation, public policies and major investments are often prepared without sufficient impact assessments and internal and public consultations.⁶

4.1.2. Field visit

Key findings. There had been a significant reshuffling in the **Ministry of Defence** (MoD) project team, which was due to the appointment of the new Government in 2016. As of July 2017, there are five new members on the MoD project team, out of 13 members altogether, including the new head of the project team. Some members with a long institutional memory of the project are no longer on board. The head of the project team is still struggling to grasp all of the aspects of the project, but seems confident they will catch up with the belated project activities (drafting of a new Law on Armed Forces and implementing the regulation on the exception from public procurement in the defence and security sector). Parallel lines of communication in the MoD with the project also pose a challenge, which the MoD needs to address. The project has successfully collaborated with NATO (development of the Integrity Plan 2014-2016 as well as a new integrity plan).

The project activities plan from the **Ministry of Interior** (MoI) has been fully accomplished thus far; this among others is attributed to the fact that there have been only minor changes in the project team. The project is credited for the MoI establishing a practice of played consulting with the Ministry of Public

⁵ COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS

2016 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, Brussels, 10.11.2015 SWD(2015) 210 final, p. 2.

⁶ COMMUNICATION, p. 6.

Administration; this ensures a holistic approach in project implementation and minimizes the risk of duplicative activities (*supra*, Chapter 2). In addition, in recognition of the project, the MoI project team was approached by the Police Special Antiterrorism Unit which requested CIDS assistance in drafting a regulation on their legal status (currently, the Unit operates in the legal limbo), although this assistance was not part of the project work plan (see Chapter 4.3. Table 2). This is a testimony to the kind of reputation CIDS has built with the MoI. The MoI project team also suggested room for a greater political involvement on the side of Norway, to ensure the smooth implementation of the project.

The **beneficiary** does not have a specific media and outreach strategy developed for the project. There is no cooperation with CSOs or academia on the project. Even a leading CSO in the monitoring of the defence and security sector does not have any knowledge of the project and its results. The CIDS project team have suggested trying to engage academia in the project, but its overall capacity is weak.

There is a successful cooperation with the **OSCE** (development of the MoI Gender Action Plan, as well as well as the curricula and training on the implementation of the MoI Integrity Strategy). Moving forward, possible areas of collaboration include implementation of the MoI Integrity Plan and addressing gender balance within the police. A successful collaboration has been established with the **Regional School of Public Administration** (RESPA) in the preparation of the regional brochure on integrity. RESPA manages a regional network of agencies for anti-corruption and there is room for further collaboration on the project with respect to integrity capacity building.

A leading **CSO** in monitoring defence and security sector reforms (with whom we had subsequent skype meeting) notes progress in developing an enabling framework for integrity in the MoI (2014 and 2016 integrity plans), but are not aware of the project’s role in this respect. They feel that the entire framework for integrity needs further improvements, including *human resource* management (lack of proper strategic framework and practice for the employment planning, career development and meritocracy) and *financial management* (poor planning and budgeting of public procurements, as well as internal and state audit control).

4.1.3. Review of the specific objectives, outcomes and outputs:

The Montenegro sub-project, as well as the other two sub-projects, envisages specific objectives. Table I presents the inventory of the accomplished project outcomes *which already have a measurable output* (impact), against the specific objectives. Table II details those outcomes and the corresponding outputs. The **same methodology** is applied in reviewing the sub-projects in BiH and Kosovo.

TABLE 1

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES:	OUTCOMES:
1.1. To provide assistance in the implementation of proposals to minimize corruption risks through a) better administrative procedures, b) improved systems for public procurement, c) better arrangements for asset disposal, d) enhanced transparency, e) a better regime for managing conflicts of interests, and f) more adequate arrangements for corruption risk management.	Project Outcomes 1-9.

1.2. To increase levels of competence among civil servants and raise awareness among representatives of academic institutions and civil society to promote integrity in the security and defence areas.	Project Outcomes 10-14.
1.3. To systematize and disseminate security-related experience that may be conducive to pro-integrity reforms in other parts of the public administration in Montenegro.	Project Outcomes:

TABLE 2

PROJECT OUTCOMES:	PROJECT OUTPUTS:
1. Assistance in preparation of the integrity plans in MoD and MoI as well as in the revisions of the MoD integrity plan (integrity plans adopted, revisions pending).	Integrity plans improved with respect to administrative procedures, public procurement, asset disposal, handling conflicts of interest, free access to information, corruption risk management and monitoring.
2. Functional review of the MoD procurement sector.	Key areas for improvements in the procurement sector identified in the review.
3. Assistance in preparation of the Law on Armed Forces.	The Law in compliance with NATO requirements.
4. Policy paper on internal control of the Police in Montenegro.	Key areas for improvements in the Police internal control identified.
5. Assistance in developing the MoI Gender Action Plan.	The necessary action framework for tackling gender imbalance in MoI put in place.
6. Workshop on international standards and practices in the area of delegation of authority.	Improved understanding of the MoD staff on issues related to the delegation of authority (<i>source of verification</i> : evaluation of the workshop).
7. Assistance in Developing the Strategy for Police Administration Development 2016 – 2020 and the Action Plan for 2016 – 2017;	The necessary strategic framework for Police Administration Development created.
8. Assistance in preparing the Law on Administrative Procedures.	The legal framework for administrative procedures improved.
9. Assistance in preparing amendments to the Law on Civil Servants and State Employees.	The legal framework civil servants and stay employees improved.
10. Regional workshop (i.e. Western Balkans) to facilitate exchange of experience among the representatives of interior ministries in the area of ethics, integrity and training of police officers.	Improved understanding of the MoI staff on issues related to ethics, integrity and training of police officers (<i>source of verification</i> : evaluation of the workshop).
11. International conference on developing the by-law concerning procurement for the defence and security sector in line with the EU Directive 2009/81/EC.	Improved understanding of the MoD and MoI staff on the permissible scope of exemptions from public procurement in the defence and security sector (<i>source of verification</i> : evaluation of the conference).
12. Trainings to strengthen the system for corruption risk management and monitoring.	Improved understanding of the corruption risk management by the MoD and MoI staff in charge of overseeing the anti-corruption and antifraud policies (<i>source of verification</i> : evaluation of the workshops).
13. Conference on the best international practices with respect to the legal and operational status of the special police unit and a workshop for the Montenegro Police Special Antiterrorism Unit.	Improved understanding of the Special Antiterrorism Unit management and officers of issues related to the legal and operational status of special police units (<i>source of verification</i> : evaluation of the conference and workshop).

14. Workshop to present and discuss the methodology for conducting the functional review of the MoI procurement sector.	Improved understanding of the MoI staff in the public procurement sector on the major findings of the functional review, including areas of improvements (<i>source of verification</i> : evaluation of the workshop).
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The foregoing specific objectives and outcomes have been reviewed against the following benchmark framework:

BENCHMARKS	ASSESSMENT	MITIGATION
CLARITY		
1. Are the project specific objectives clearly designed and evidence-based?	1-3. The review reveals that the project is clearly designed and evidence based. Project indicators are reflective of the project goals and provide the appropriate framework to assess the project-specific objectives.	N/A
2. Are the project indicators clearly defined and reflective of the project goals?		
3. Are there sufficient numbers of quantitative and qualitative indicators to assess the project-specific objectives?		
4. Is the respective role of key stakeholders with regard to the project-specific objectives clearly defined?	4. The project document makes it clear that the key beneficiary and implementer of the project are MoD and MoI, with CIDS playing an expert role.	N/A
PROPORTIONALITY		
5. Are the project-specific objectives reflective of the current capacities of the MoD and MoI?	5. The project document takes into account the current capacities and is prepared based on the thorough needs assessment.	
OUTREACH		
6. Are the project-specific objectives and goals properly communicated to the public?	6. There is poor visibility of the project.	6-7. Pro-active approach of the MoD and MoI in presenting project results and how they impact on citizens. This may include holding special briefings for media and CSOs and academia, creative use of social media, etc.
7. Is there a collaboration with CSOs and academia?	7. There is no collaboration with CSOs and academia	
TIME FRAME		
8. Is the time frame envisaged for the realization of project activities sufficient relative to the project-specific objectives?	8. Stakeholders agree that there's sufficient time allocated for the realization of project activities: MoI does not have any backlog in the realization of project activities, while MoD's backlog is due to the recent re-organization.	N/A
SYNERGY		
9. Are there other initiatives on the side of government or donors which can be utilized for the realization of the project-specific objectives – or which might stand in the way of their realization?	9. The project has accomplished synergy with the OSCE and RESPA initiatives.	N/A

4.2. Bosnia and Herzegovina

4.2.1. General background.

BiH submitted an application for a full membership to the EU in February 2016, which is currently under consideration. In 2015, following repeated calls by the EC, the BiH Council of Ministers set up a complex political mechanism to coordinate the process of EU integration, which includes representatives of the state and entity level governments, as well as the District of Brcko and canton level governments. This mechanism adopted the so-called 'Reform Agenda' 2015-2018- a political document which maps out priority reform areas. The justice and rule section in the Reform Agenda envisages a set of policy measures to tackle corruption, while the section dealing with public administration reforms envisages a new normative framework for civil service and public procurement.

The **institutional** framework for **integrity** at the state level includes: the parliamentary joint commission for security and defence; the BiH Ombudsperson; the Agency for the Protection of Personal Data; the Agency for Anti-Corruption and Coordination of Fight against Corruption; and the Commission for the Prevention of the Conflicts of Interests. The **legal** and **strategic** framework governing **integrity** includes the Law on State Servants, the Law on the Protection of the Whistle Blower, the Public Procurement Law (2014), the BiH Law on Administrative Procedure (as amended in 2016), and the Anti-Corruption Strategy 2015-2019 with the Action Plan.

The 2016 EC **Progress Report** for BiH notes that some progress was made with the adoption of action plans at various levels of governance to fight corruption, but their fragmentation makes implementation less effective. It also notes that BiH is at an early stage with the reform of its **public administration**, with little progress to report. A harmonised approach to policy development and coordination is still largely lacking, which can also be ascribed to the cumbersome political structure.⁷ The **Public Administration Reforms Coordination Office** is in charge of coordination of public administration reforms at all levels of governance, including the new strategy for public administration reform, which is still a work in progress.

4.2.2. Field visit

Key findings. In meetings with key project personnel from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) we learned that the CIDS project is one of the MoD's priorities. The project has primarily focused on the improvements of the normative framework as well as public procurement processes. In this respect, CIDS has aided the MoD in updating tender documentation for the procurement of goods pursuant to the new by-laws, which introduced e-auctions, and in preparing instruction on the procurement of classified goods and services, which are exempted from public procurement rules. As for the latter, we learned that the MoD is the only ministry of defence in the region which regulates this issue, in order to prevent misuses in the procurement of classified goods and service. CIDS is also providing assistance to the MoD in drafting an implementing regulation (by-laws) of procurement of goods and services which are exempted from public procurement (a project which was initially supported only by NATO). Most recently, CIDS is aiding the MoD in preparing an instruction on emergency procurement. The MoD appreciates the flexibility of the project, which allows for the ongoing revisions of the plan activities and the time thereof. Examples include a draft strategy for the development of MoD procurement

⁷ European Commission, Bosnia and Herzegovina 2016 Report, Brussels, 9.11.2016 SWD(2016) 365 final, p. 9.

arrangements and an action plan for its implementation, for which MoD is no longer sure it is necessary, given the legislative developments in this area.

In 2017, CIDS published the Functional Analyses of the Sector of Public Procurement in the Ministry of Defence. The study sought to identify critical issues as well as offer practical advice and tools to the MoD on their work to improve the procurement system. While the study was made in close collaboration with the MoD project team, it makes it clear that it is the sole responsibility of CIDS. Nevertheless, the Minister of Defence took the findings of the study personally, and tried to distance the Ministry from any involvement in the study, in order to undercut its credibility. The Minister approached the Norwegian Ambassador in BiH and requested her to 'do something' and revoke the study, which she declined. He then turned to the head of the MoD project team, pressuring him to distance the project team from the findings in the study. However, the head of the project team refused. This incident showcases both the **level of the commitment** of the MoD project team as well as the kind of **professional bond** which they have developed with the CIDS Project Team. The MoD head of the project team suggested that the **Steering Committee** mechanism eventually helped diffuse tensions with the Minister. However, he also suggested that there is a room for a greater **political involvement** on the side of **Norway**, to ensure the smooth implementation of the project as well as increase the leverage of the project team with the Minister. This suggestion is consistent with the one put forward by the Montenegrin MoI project team (*supra*, 4.1.2.). In the subsequent meeting with the Norwegian Ambassador we learned that she would accompany the Norwegian Ministry of Defence delegation, which was coming to Sarajevo the week after our filed visit, to get first-hand information about the progress of the project. Moving forward, the MoD project team underscored the need for additional capacity building in the MoD contracting department, once the new normative framework is put in place. The MoD does not have a specific media and outreach strategy with respect to the project.

Meeting with BiH NATO Headquarter Office. NATO is the key reform player with regard to BiH meeting the **political** criteria for a full NATO membership. BiH made a decision to join the NATO Membership Action Plan in April 2010, which is a step towards a full membership. BiH still needs, however, to fulfill the last criteria of transferring MoD real estate from decentralised to central levels. This is facing staunch opposition from the semi-autonomous Republika Srpska. The NATO Office is collaborating with the CIDS project and has been engaged for years in public procurement issues. The collaboration includes both support to creating an enabling normative framework for public procurement as well as capacity building in the MoD. Those efforts have **payed off**, given that the MoD public procurement framework and practices (however still flawed) are the **most advanced** relative to the other line ministries with the BiH Council of Ministers – which is to be **credited** to CIDS and NATO joint efforts. NATO also credited CIDS functional analyses (*supra*) for providing critical insight of the weak points in the MoD procurement system, which calls for further reforms. CIDS assistance would be critical in the development of the MoD tender compliance matrix, which would facilitate and reduce the cost of tender applicants; NATO does not have resources to engage in this activity.

Moving forward, there is a need for additional capacity building of the MoD contracting department. In addition, there is a need for a **political coordination** between NATO and CIDS project at **political levels**, to ensure a better flow of information and the necessary synergy between the two projects. There is also a need for better donor coordination in the defence sector. CIDS is credited for efforts to ensure such coordination.

CSOs Perspective. The review team met with a representative of a CSO which has been monitoring defence and security reforms for the last 16 years. The CSO regards the establishment of the MoD in 2005 (in which they also played a role) as one of the most significant achievements in the defence sector. The CSO has excellent collaboration with the CIDS project, in terms of information sharing and coordination of their activities. They have corroborated information on the capacity building needs, but also noted the need for those efforts to be aligned with general public administration reforms. In addition, there is room to improve the internal functioning of the MoD in terms of simpler, more effective and less costly procedures. There is concern that the obstructionist forces might prevail in the 2018 general election, which will adversely impact on the pace of reforms in the defence sector.

4.2.3. Review of the specific objectives, outcomes and outputs

TABLE 3

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES:	OUTCOMES:
1.1. To make levels of competence among MoD officials more conducive to promoting transparency, value for money, integrity and accountability in the MoD procurement system.	Project Outcomes 1-2.
1.2. To provide assistance in making procedures and practices more conducive to promoting transparency, value for money, integrity, and accountability in the MoD procurement system.	Project Outcomes 3.
1.3. To provide assistance in making organizational arrangements more conducive to promoting transparency, value for money, integrity, and accountability in the MoD procurement system.	Project Outcomes: 4
1.4. If feasible: provide assistance in making IT systems better suited to support transparency, value for money, integrity and accountability in the MoD procurement system.	Project Outcomes:

TABLE 4

PROJECT OUTCOMES:	PROJECT OUTPUTS:
1. Trainings on ISO standards in public procurement.	MoD contracting department staff better understands ISO standards in the public procurement process (<i>source of verification</i> : training evaluations).
2. Workshops on tender documentation, framework contracts, and e-auctions.	MoD contracting department staff better understands the tender documentation requirements, the underlying function and rules governing the framework contracts, as well as the concept of e-action (<i>source of verification</i> : workshops evaluations).
3. New tender documentation developed or revised, along with standard forms for each phase of the procurement procedure - and for all kinds of procurement (open, restricted, closed).	<i>Tender documentation</i> and standards form improved for each phase and all kinds of procurement; <i>Instructions</i> on emergency procurement issued; <i>Tender documentation</i> for procurement of goods revised pursuant to the new by law introducing e-auctions.
4. Trainings for procurement planners and participants in the market research system within the	Obligatory report for market research and procurement planning introduced.

MoD (originally: development of new system of procurement planning)	
5. Functional analyses of the procurement system in MoD published.	Critical issues in the procurement system identified and exposed.

The foregoing specific objectives and outcomes have been reviewed against the following benchmark framework:

BENCHMARKS	ASSESSMENT	MITIGATION
CLARITY		
1. Are the project specific objectives clearly and evidence-based designed?	1-3. The review reveals that the project is clearly and evidence based designed. Project indicators are reflective of the project goals and provide the appropriate framework to assess the project specific objectives.	N/A
2. Are the project indicators clearly defined and reflective of the project specific objectives?		
3. Are there sufficient numbers of quantitative and qualitative indicators to assess the project specific objectives?		
4. Is the respective role of key stakeholders with regard to the project specific objectives clearly defined?	4. The project document makes it clear that the key beneficiary and implementer of the project is MoD, with CIDS playing an expert role.	N/A
PROPORTIONALITY		
5. Are the project specific objectives reflective of the current capacities of MoD?	5. The project document takes into account the current capacity and is prepared based on the thorough needs assessment.	
OUTREACH		
6. Are the project specific objectives properly communicated to the public?	6. There is a poor visibility of the project.	6-7. Pro-active approach of the MoD in presenting project results and how they impact on citizens. This may include holding special briefings for media, CSOs and academia, creative use of social media, etc.
7. Is there a collaboration with CSOs and academia?	7. The project has a productive relationship with a major CSO monitoring reforms in the defence sector. No collaboration with academia.	
TIME FRAME		
8. Is the time frame envisaged for the realization of project activities sufficient relative to the project specific objectives?	8. Due to the flexibility of the project design, there is enough time for the realization as well as revisions of the project activities.	N/A
SYNERGY		
9. Are there other initiatives on the side of government or donors which can be utilized for the realization of the project objectives – or which might stand in the way of their realization?	9. The project has accomplished synergy with the NATO project, which leads reforms in the defence sector. It also coordinates with the Austria funded project in the defence sector.	N/A

4.3. Kosovo

4.3.1. General background.

The Stabilization and Association Agreement (SSA) between the EU and Kosovo entered into force in April 2016. The Agreement is the first formal contractual relationship that ties the EU and Kosovo together. SSA will test the government's capabilities in the coming years as it requires more robust international-standards for public administration processes and capabilities to be in place. In November 2016 the Government adopted the **European Reform Agenda**, to complement Kosovo's Economic Reform Programme, which was submitted to the EU in January 2016. The Agenda acknowledges that, in order for the SSA to be fully utilized, urgent economic reforms (as set out in the Economic Reform Programme), underpinned by the rule of law, are needed. The Agenda as such contains 22 priorities and 130 actions, in the areas of governance, rule of law, economic growth, competitiveness, education, and job creation. If implemented fully, these actions will support SAA implementation, improve governance and the business environment, and consolidate the state. In essence, ERA targets the areas in which the Kosovo government needs to make major improvements, including tackling corruption and conflict of interest through a series of measures, such as: 1) Reviewing and adopting legislation making the suspension and/or removal of public officials respectively indicted and convicted for corruption mandatory; 2) Amending the Law on Conflict of Interest and related regulations to bring them in line with European standards; 3) Strengthening the accountability system in state institutions; 4) Ensuring that the planned legislative package covering civil service, salaries and organization of state administration is prepared in a coordinated way; and 5) Implementing the government decision of March 2016 on introducing mandatory electronic procurement, along with the indicated timelines.

In this regard, Kosovo's 'infrastructure' for developing staff and human resource levels within the public administration, which is a key pre-condition to a successful implementation of the SAA, still remains weak and largely under-resourced. As noted by the EC progress report of 2016 (and previous reports), the implementation of the public administration reform package is hampered by considerable delays and there are also serious concerns about the financial sustainability of the reforms. Some progress was made with the adoption of a comprehensive public financial management strategy, and of the law on general administrative procedures, but there is still a lack of progress in other areas.

The state administration is organised in a fragmented way which does not ensure effective lines of accountability. The current law on state administration has allowed 46 government agencies to be established, some of which have overlapping responsibilities. Furthermore, over 30 independent institutions report directly to the assembly, which lacks the powers and capacity to effectively supervise them. Many of these institutions and government agencies do not comply with the civil service law, therefore contributing to further fragmentation of the administration. Lines of accountability within many institutions are weak and there is no clear delegation of responsibilities to middle management. The current law on the civil service establishes a single, unitary system of public service at central government and municipal levels. The law formally provides for merit-based recruitment, promotions and dismissals based on objective criteria, however, loopholes in the law allow contradictory practices, notably on the conversion of temporary staff into permanent civil servants without public competition. Progress has been made in extending the human resource management information system to all institutions, but the system is not up-to-date and does not perform all the mandatory tasks set out in the legislation. Political influence over appointments and dismissals continues to be a serious concern,

especially on the selection of senior management. Women and non-majority communities are still not adequately represented in public institutions.

As part of the reform package, in order to address the pertinent gaps and ensure a more accountable and depoliticized public administration, the government has committed itself to developing a new package of laws, including the law on organisation of state administration, the law on civil service and the law on salaries, which also impacts directly on the CIDS project implementation, but rather in a positive way as it removes some of the key barriers concerning the functioning of civil service in MKSF as well. The three laws have yet to be passed, and are expected to be adopted as a package in late 2017.

4.3.2. Field visit

Meetings in MKSF: Strengthening the integrity framework. The General Secretary of MKSF praised the project as “extremely successful”. The MKSF is one of the first ministries to have developed the integrity plan. As a result, MKSF is better informed and organized to preserve the institutional integrity and improve internal control mechanisms. The Secretary also noted that support is needed for an additional three years, in order, to complete the transformation cycle. The MKSF has been pro-active in reaching out to other line ministries and offering assistance in developing their respective integrity plans. However, many ministries are still not familiar with the concept, but do understand the need to proceed with preparations of the integrity plans. The Ministry of Interior requested MKSF assistance in the development of the integrity plan, and it is suggested that the project be expanded so as to include the Ministry of Interior, for which there is a precedent in Montenegro. There are some gaps in the implementation (ca 25-30% activities have not been realized as planned), which is largely due to the fact that the development of the integrity plan consumed more time than originally anticipated: the MKSF should have planned the human resources for the project more carefully. A major challenge in the project implementation, and more generally, in the functioning of MKSF, is the human resources management system due to the military-civil service mix, namely, the cultural gap between the military (especially the ‘old guard’ who fought for independence) and the ‘young technocrats’. This was confirmed in the other meetings at MKSF. The eventual transformation of MKSF into the Ministry of Defense will apparently address this issue through a separate law for MoD civil servants. Furthermore, the eventual KSF transformation into Army would not have an adverse impact on the CIDS project, but would rather result in more demand for CIDS type of services. In terms of the media and outreach strategy, the MKSF organizes a conference for media and CSOs to present their activities twice annually, and also publishes the annual activity report. They collaborate with two CSOs which monitor reforms in the security sector. According to public surveys, the KSF continues to be the most trustful state institution in the eyes of the public since 2012.

The Director of the Directorate for Policy and Plans also spoke highly of the project and its meticulous preparation: it is the CIDS project that fully exposed the MKSF staff to the concept of integrity and why it matters. This has probably been the largest accomplishment of the project thus far. In addition, **lessons learned** from the CIDS project will be **incorporated** into the new **Anti-Corruption Strategy 2017-2020**. The MKSF has developed an internal project monitoring matrix which the staff reviews every three months. There is a need to ensure the **coordination** between the CIDS project and NATO Liaison Advisory Office which sees building integrity as one of the key areas of its support to the MKSF. There is a need to **coordinate** with other donors, in particular with U.K support (they already coordinate with the CIDS

project) as well as UNDP, who are supporting the development of the integrity plan of the Ministry of Interior and plan to work with other line ministries as well.

The Chief of Policy Planning and Strategic Analyses was responsible for the development of the Action Plan for the Integrity Plan and monitors progress of its implementation. Implementation started in July 2016 by a highly visible launching event, to demonstrate that MKSF is serious about transparency and fighting corruption. Monitoring is based on the matrix developed in collaboration with the CIDS project. Internal consultations on progress in implementation are conducted every three months, while the progress report is published annually. Implementation is progressing well, however some activities are put on hold because the Government's working group commissioned with preparation of the implementing regulation governing exceptions in the public procurement in the security sector has failed to deliver. Staffing with the MKSF suffers from the Government's decision to freeze the employment in the public sector; this has also impacted on some of the project activities.

Meeting in MKSF: Support to capacity development. From the Head of Sector of the Department for Personnel Policy we learned that the general analyses of the department and the personnel needs was prepared with the assistance of the CIDS project. This led to a much more elaborate job description and separation between the military and civilian part. The internal act on job description is aligned with the EU standards. The eventual transformation into Army will have an impact on the organization of the integrated Ministry: the current ratio of 60% civilians and 40% military is expected to change to 80% civilians and 20% military. The Strategy of Human Resources and the Action Plan is also developed with the assistance of the CIDS project. As compared to the prior one, the new one is much more elaborate and incorporates all human resources elements. Challenges of huge staff turnaround still persists. The CIDS project regional and wider European information and experience sharing is regarded very useful.

NATO Liaison Team. The Liaison team is responsible for the entire reform process (military and civilian part). NATO provide support to the MKSF with respect to procurement, IT, human rights, gender issues, etc). There is coordination with the MKSF on reforms efforts. The Head of the Team recently took the post, and had previously heard about the CIDS project but was unsure of the kind of assistance the CIDS provides to MKSF. The need for the MKSF to coordinate donor reform support was emphasized.

Parliamentary oversight. The former member of the parliamentary committee for internal affairs, security and supervision of the Kosovo Security Force provided valuable input on the state of play in the security sector. He notes that the project enjoys a great reputation and is responsive to the needs of MKSF in fulfilling its obligations and responsibilities. General challenges related to MKSF which need to be further addressed by the project include:

1. Long overdue structural changes - same people have occupied the top positions for too long, limiting the space for entry of new, more qualified candidates. This compromises the internal control mechanisms, as overtime a culture of clienteles and nepotism has taken root, resulting in non-merit based recruitment of new entrants into MKSF, with political, regional and clientelestic relations to the top MKSF management. There are cases of Father-Son-Grandson being recruited into KSF, and numerous extended family members coming predominately from the two main regions linked to former KLA commanders;
2. Regional, gender and minority misrepresentation in interview panels, resulting in reduced entry of such categories into MKSF;

3. Lack of advancement opportunities, as a result of prolonged use of 'temporary appointments' of commanders which do not allow to obtain the adequate rank, hence not able to advance to higher ranks;
4. Dubious procurement practices due to the weak and politicized internal control mechanisms (internal audit).

His key recommendations include:

1. Strengthen internal audit in KSF to ensure greater professionalism and full integrity in their work (more staff and empowerment needed);
2. Review the 'Code of Ethics' of KSF and increase awareness of staff on derived duties and obligations and consequences of non-compliance;
3. Increase the awareness of CSOs and Media on KSF affairs, and enhance access to documents and information of MKSF (not everything is classified, which is the usual excuse for not disclosing information);
4. Build mechanisms that allow for involvement of external experts into KSF policy discussions;
5. Open recruitment/advancement and procurement processes to external experts in observation capacity;
6. Strengthen processes related to declaration of assets and conflict of interest of top MKSF officials;
7. Strengthen cooperation with the Ombudsperson;
8. Greater involvement/reporting to Assembly Committee on implementation of the integrity plans (including by Police, and other relevant security bodies);
9. Increase participation of CSOs and Media in Committee meetings as observers; and
10. Strengthen security related research capacity of the Kosovo Assembly.

The MKSF progress reporting on the project's implementation needs to move from process to results. For future phases, the number of trainings held as currently reported is irrelevant - we need to see the results of such trainings (e.g. number of complaints related to recruitment and procurement dropped; number of female and minority recruits increased; regional representation balanced, etc.).

The MKSF staff of the public procurement department has followed appropriate training of public procurement, however increased competence in specialized defense procurement, construction engineering, and information technology is needed for better design of technical specifications.

4.3.3 Review of the specific objectives, outcomes and outputs

Table 5

While there are two sub-projects in Kosovo, because they deal with the related issues and have the same beneficiary, they are **functionally** one sub-project and as such are presented in the table.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES:	OUTCOMES:
1.1. To provide assistance to the MKSF in the implementation of proposals to minimize corruption risks through improved procedures for a) public procurement, b) the handling of conflicts of interest, and c) corruption-risk management and monitoring.	Project Outcomes 1-5.

1.2. To increase levels of competence among civil servants and raise awareness among representatives of academic institutions and civil society to promote integrity in the security area.	Project Outcomes 6-13.
1.3. To systematize and disseminate security-related experience that may be conducive to pro-integrity reforms in other parts of the public administration in Kosovo.	Project Outcomes:

TABLE 6

PROJECT OUTCOMES:	PROJECT OUTPUTS:
1. Assistance to MKSF in the development of the corruption risk self-assessment.	Self-assessment report identified critical issues related to corruption that needed to be addressed in the MKSF Integrity Plan
2. Assistance to MKSF in the development of the Integrity Plan.	<i>Integrity Plan</i> provides strategic framework to address critical issues with respect to the integrity in the MKSF. <i>Integrity Plan</i> already serves as a role model for the other line ministries.
3. Assistance to MKSF in the development of a matrix to track progress in the implementation of the MKSF Integrity Plan	Matrix is already facilitating the monitoring of the Integrity Plan.
4. Assistance to MKSF in the revisions of the internal procedures governing conflict of interest and secondary employment.	Strengthen procedures and rules with respect to the conflict of interest and secondary employment.
5. Assistance to MKSF in the development of the training plan on issues covered in the Integrity Plan.	Action framework for capacity building on integration issues put in place.
6. Assistance to the MKSF HRM in developing new Planning Guideline.	Improved normative system of HRM planning in place.
7. Assistance to the MKSF in the development of new job description standards.	Necessary framework for job description for pending HRM reforms in the MKSF created.
8. Assistance to MKSF in the development of Strategy of Human Resources and the Action Plan	Improved strategic and implementing framework for human resources development put in place.
9. Assistance in preparing revisions to Regulation 05/2012 of Performance Appraisal of Public Administration.	The new Law on Civil Servants as well as the Regulation on PA will be revised per CIDS suggestions.
10. Training on exemptions in public procurement for Defence and Security Sector for the officials of MKSF, Police, Intelligence Agency and Public Procurement Review Body.	<i>Improved</i> understanding on the exemption rules among members of the working group commissioned with preparation of the public procurement exemption regulation in the defence and security sector (<i>source of verification</i> : evaluations of the training). <i>Brochure</i> on regional experience on those issue published – stakeholders exposed to regional experience.
11. EC Directive 2009/81 (governing public procurement exemptions in the defence and security sector) translated into Albanian language.	Members of the working groups commissioned with preparation of the public procurement exemption regulation exposed to the EU regulation on the subject.
12. Study visit to Croatian MoD of the MKSF members of the working group in charge of preparation of the Integrity Plan and visit to Norway.	Members of the working groups exposed to regional and European experience in the preparation of the integrity plan.

13. Conference on Conference on the “Prospects of Integrity in the MKSF”, with governmental and civil society representatives (Completed)

Awareness raising and reaching out campaign:

- special issue in the MKSF newsletter on integrity;
- Launching event of the Integrity Plan, involving government officials, donors, CSOs, and media;
- Interviews on TV, newspaper and social media on integrity issues.

The foregoing specific objectives and outcomes have been reviewed against the following benchmark framework:

BENCHMARKS	ASSESSMENT	MITIGATION
CLARITY		
1. Are the project specific objectives clearly and evidence-based designed?	1-3. The review reveals that the project is clearly and evidence based designed. Project indicators are reflective of the project goals and provide the appropriate framework to assess the project specific objectives.	N/A
2. Are the project indicators clearly defined and reflective of the project specific objectives?		
3. Are there sufficient numbers of quantitative and qualitative indicators to assess the project specific objectives?		
4. Is the respective role of key stakeholders with regard to the project specific objectives clearly defined?	4. The project document makes it clear that the key beneficiary and implementer of the project is MoD, with CIDS playing an expert role.	N/A
PROPORTIONALITY		
5. Are the project specific objectives reflective of the current capacities of MoD?	5.The project document takes into account the current capacity and is prepared based on the thorough needs assessment.	
OUTREACH		
6. Are the project specific objectives properly communicated to the public?	6. Kosovo has ensured the best outreach of the project relative to the other two beneficiary countries.	6-7.
7. Is there a collaboration with CSOs and academia?	7. The project has a productive relationship with CSOs monitoring reforms in the defence sector. There is no collaboration with academia.	
TIME FRAME		
8. Is the time frame envisaged for the realization of project activities sufficient relative to the project specific objectives?	8. Due to the flexibility of the project design, there is enough time for the realization as well as revisions of the project activities.	N/A
SYNERGY		
9. Are there other initiatives on the side of government or donors which can be utilized for the realization of the project objectives – or which might stand in the way of their realization?	9. The project has accomplished synergy with the NATO project, which leads reforms in the defence sector. The project needs to strengthen cooperation with UNDP, which is	N/A

	supporting the development of Integrity Plans in the Ministry of Interior and plans to extend to other ministries as well.	
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5. Key findings and recommendations

- The **Integrity project**, which is a complex, multifaceted and multi-country project, has been a **success** by most measures.
- The project is **meticulously** designed; it is based on the **demand** driven, **evidence-based** and participatory approach in all phases of project preparation, as well as the **local** ownership.
- The project embraces a **holistic approach** in that it recognizes that the issue of integrity is part of the broader public administration reforms – and needs to be duly incorporated therein. This minimizes the risk of overlapping with other reform initiatives and allows for the necessary coordination of activities.
- The project is in alignment with the EU mid-term *Enlargement Strategy 2015-2019* which made public administration reform one of the top priorities; this gives additional **political leverage** to the project;
- The composition of the project team is a blend of regional, national and international experts, with **Norwegian “soft hand” management**. It is mindful of the cultural context and recognizes the multiple benefits of local and regional experts taking the lead in project implementation, with proper Norwegian expert support.
- The required commitment, sophistication and competence of the respective beneficiaries’ project teams (ministries of defence/security) is **very high**, which was evident in the interviews conducted. There is a palpable **sense of pride** among project team members for being part of this project.
- The level of the beneficiary **satisfaction** with the project is also **very high**; the project is praised for its design, targeted assistance and flexibility, as well as the expertise it has provided.
- The feedback received from other **donors** supporting defence and security sectors about the project is **overwhelmingly** positive, not least because the project has been successful in timely mapping out key donors in those sectors and ensuring proper coordination of activities.
- Perhaps the greatest accomplishment of the project thus far is that it has increased the understanding of the concept of **integrity** the beneficiaries had not been exposed to before. The beneficiaries now understand the underlying role and significance of the concept. Given that integrity is part of the EU and NATO reform agenda, it can be argued that the pioneering work of the project in this area has furthered the EU and NATO reforms in the beneficiary countries.
- While the project is still in the implementing phase, there is already a number of specific outcomes which the report has identified; this attests to the project design methodology.
- The activities on the projects are largely proceeding as planned. There have been some deviations from the agreed time table, in particular with the planned activities which require prior legislative changes which are outside of the jurisdiction of the beneficiary (the respective ministries).
- Overall, the visibility and outreach of the project is poor and needs to be improved. There is not a particular media strategy and there is limited interaction with CSOs.

- There is a lack of strategy and targeted interventions on **gender**.
- There is no overarching **project document** and **results framework**. This has led to some **administrative and reporting challenges** between the Norwegian MFA (grantor) and Norwegian MoD/CIDS (grantee).
- At the country level the reporting needs to move from **process to results reporting**.

In order to maximise the lasting impact and sustainability of the project, we **recommend**:

- **Consider an extension of the project:** Integrity reforms are a complex undertaking: they take, time, resources, commitment and expertise of the parties involved – as well as public support. The project is now entering its **critical** phase. It is expected that the work on the necessary legal framework will largely be completed by the end of this project cycle. However, critical for the lasting impact of the project will be the **implementation** of the new integrity framework in place. This would require ongoing and targeted **capacity** building efforts over a significant period of time. Otherwise, there is the perceived **danger** that the project will not fully realize its goals and objectives, and achieve lasting **sustainability**. In addition, without **ongoing** capacity building efforts, there is **high** probability of **back sliding** of the progress made. Integrity reforms target powerful interests in the government and require significant **changes** in behavior. Without sustained and coordinated efforts of all parties involved, the achieved progress can easily be **reversed**.
- There are a number of **lessons learned**, which need to be duly incorporated if there is a project extension:
 - **Improve the project document and internal project administration:** the current project consists of one grant with multiple country-project documents. There should be one unified project document with corresponding results framework, goal hierarchy and risk assessment. A concise project document, in line with Norad guidance⁸, comprised of clear reporting requirements and a results framework is likely to improve the administrative cooperation between NMFA and NMoD.
 - **Increase political coordination:** There is a perceived need for more regular meetings between the Norwegian Ministry of Defence high-ranking representatives and their counterparts in the beneficiary countries; this would increase both the leverage of the project as well as the beneficiary project team among the beneficiary top leadership (*infra*, 4.1.2., 4.2.2.)
 - **Consider establishing the project coordination board in Kosovo and Montenegro.** As the review suggests, the experience with the project coordination board in Bosnia and Hercegovina has been positive and is worth considering with respect to the other two beneficiaries (*infra*, 2. 4.2.2.)
 - **Ensure continued donor coordination.** Given that public administration reform is a top priority for the EU enlargement process, significant EU funding as well as bilateral assistance is expected to be designated for that purpose in the coming period, which needs to be coordinated with the project.

⁸ <https://www.norad.no/om-bistand/publikasjon/2009/results-management-in-norwegian-development-cooperation--a-practical-guide/>

- **Prepare a contingency plan.** There have been some deviations from the agreed activity time table, in particular, with respect to the planned activities which require prior legislative changes which are outside of the jurisdiction of the beneficiary (the respective ministries). Depending on the prospect of those changes to come to fruition any time soon, this might require developing contingency plans for the project implementation.
 - **Prepare a sustainability and utilization plan.** The beneficiary needs to present a clear plan as to how the lasting sustainability of the project will be ensured, as well as how it plans to utilize the project experience for embarking on related reforms.
 - **Ensure institutional coordination and sharing.** Given that integrity is part of a broader public administration reform, the beneficiary needs to present a plan as to how the necessary coordination among the line ministries and institutions will be ensured – as well as how they plan to share the project’s lessons learned with other line ministries and institutions (ombudsperson, anti-corruption agencies, etc.).
 - Develop a **gender approach** to the project; how can gender gaps associated with the defence and security sectors be addressed by the project in the target countries? An example of this is the Montenegrin Ministry of Interior, which is developing a Gender Action Plan, to increase number of women in the police
 - **Prepare a visibility and outreach plan.** Overall, there is need to increase the visibility and outreach of the project. Integrity reforms, as part of public administration reforms, are ultimately about citizens and for citizens. That message needs to be communicated to the public clearly. This would conceivably garner public support for the reform issues and help minimize the risk of political obstruction of the reforms, and hence the project implementation.
 - **Reporting procedures.** Reporting on the projects’ implementation needs to move from process to results. For future phases, the number of trainings held as currently reported is irrelevant – there is a need to see the results of such trainings (e.g. number of complaints related to recruitment and procurement dropped; number of female and minority recruits increased; regional representation balanced, etc.).
 - **Strengthen collaboration with CSO and academia.** Overall, there is a need for increased collaboration with CSOs on the project. CSOs may be an important additional source of information pertinent to project implementation as well as a powerful ally in monitoring and advocating for the integrity reforms. To the extent possible, there is also a need to engage academia in the project implementation.
- A number of the perceived general risks may impact a decision on project extension. Political risk exists due to the unstable political environment and deeply fractioned society in the beneficiary countries. In addition, there is the perceived risk of change in the leadership of the beneficiary project team as well as the CIDS project team. However, based on the review, the perceived risks can be mitigated or are low. The perceived risks, their level, and mitigation are presented in the table below. These risks and mitigating measures should be clearly outlined in a new project document (if the project is to be extended). The below table (7) demonstrates how to do this.

TABLE 7: MOVING FORWARD: GENERAL RISK ASSESSMENT

RISK	RISK LEVEL	MITIGATION
<i>Political risks:</i> unstable governments governments not conducive to reforms	BiH: low to medium; Montenegro: low to medium; Kosovo: medium to high.	Integrity reforms integral part of PAR – which is a priority of NATO and EU – both of which have great political leverage in the beneficiary countries, regardless of who is in the government. Integrity reforms also supported by bilateral donors which significant political leverage in the countries concerned (Austria, United Kingdom).
<i>Substantial personnel changes</i> in the beneficiary team may impact on the project's institutional memory and slow down project implementation.	Low	Heads and members of the project team career professionals, rather than political appointees. Heads of project teams have recently been re-appointed in their positions.
<i>Substantial personnel changes</i> in the CIDS project team may impact on the project's institutional memory and slow down project implementation.	Low	No changes in the CIDS project team envisaged.

Appendix I: Meetings in Norway and Field Work Schedules

Meetings in Norway

Organisation	Contact
NMFA	Håvard Austad Senior Advisor Annette Bull Deputy Head of Section
CIDS	Per Christensen Director
NMoD	Kyrre Knutsen Senior Advisor

Field Work Schedules

MONTENEGRO

Monday, 4 September 2017		Podgorica & Danilovgrad
10.00 – 13:00		MoD Montenegro, Podgorica Workshop: <i>Functional Review of the MoD Procurement System</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MOD: officials directly in charge of the procurement process in the defence sector; • CIDS: Svein Eriksen, Associate Expert; Damir Ahmetovic, Regional Expert on HRM; Anela Duman, Regional Expert on Public Procurement; Rajko Radevic, Team Leader for the Montenegrin Project.
15:00 – 16:00		OSCE, Podgorica <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vladimir Ragozin, Security and Co-operation Programme Manager; • Dragica Vucinic, National Professional, Security and Co-operation Programme.
17:00 – 18:00		Regional School for Public Administration - ReSPA, Danilovgrad <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Zorana Gajic, Programme Manager.
18.30 – 20:00		CIDS Project Team <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Svein Eriksen, Associate Expert; • Rajko Radevic, Team Leader; • Damir Ahmetovic Regional HRM Expert; • Anela Duman Regional Public Procurement Expert.
09.00 – 10:0		Ministry of Defence <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Igor Vujacic, Head of the MoD project team, • Ivica Ivanovic, Procurement Department.
11.00 – 12:30		Ministry of Interior <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Biljana Dulovic, Project's PoC and Integrity Manager; • Dusan Bakovic High Police Inspector, I Class in the Sector of Public Affair Police;

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nebojsa Mrvaljevic, High Police Inspector, Boarder Police Sector.
15.30 – 16:00	Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector, CIDS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Odd Berner Malme, Expert on Police Affairs; • Rajko Radevic, Team Leader.

BiH

Tuesday, 12 September 2017	Sarajevo
11.30–12:30	CIDS Project Team <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ahmet Alihodzic, Team Leader for the BiH Project; • Damir Ahmetovic Regional HRM Expert.
13:00 – 14:30	Ministry of Defence <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mr. Borislav Jezeraškić, Assistant Minister, Procurement and Logistics, MoD, Head of the project team; • Mr. Mirza Cizmic, Head, Contracting Department, MoD BiH.
15:00 – 16:00	NATO Headquarters <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ms Lejla Mulic, Financial Advisor, NATO Headquarters Sarajevo. • Ahmet Alibasic, Team Leader.
11.00 – 12:00	Center for Security Studies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sanjin Hamidicevic, Researcher at Centre for Security Studies.
14:00–14:40	Embassy of Norway <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guri Rusten, H.E. Ambassador of the Kingdom of Norway.

KOSOVO

Monday, 18 September 2017	Prishtina
14:00–14:50	Ministry for the Kosovo Security Forces <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shkelzen Sylaj, General Secretary, head of the project team; • Col. Lt. Florin Hoxha.
15:15 – 16:00	Embassy of Norway <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • H.E. Ambassador Sjaastad.
16:15 – 17:10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Visar Sutaj, Former Transparency International, Independent Expert on Integrity.
17:15 – 18:15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Plator Avdiu, Researcher at Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS).
19:00 – 21:00	CIDS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Florian Qehaja, Team Leader.

9:40 – 10:40	Ministry for Kosovo Security Forces <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Faruk Geci, Director of Directorate for Policy and Plans; • LTC Sefer Isufi.
10:40–11:40	Ministry for Kosovo Security Forces <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Col Skender Zhitia, Head of Department for Policy and Plans; • Ismet Mecinaj, Deputy Head.
11:40 – 12:30	Ministry for Kosovo Security Forces <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • David Nixon, Chief Advisor, NATO Liaison Advisory Team at MKSF.
14:00 – 15:00	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nuredin Ibishi, Former MP, Security Expert.
15:00 – 16:00	Public Procurement Regulatory Body <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Safet Hoxha, Head of PPRB.
16:15 - 17:30	CIDS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Florian Qehaja, Team Leader.

Appendix II: Questionnaire for the Beneficiaries

1) WHAT ARE THE MAIN RESULTS ACCOMPLISHED ON THE (SUB) PROJECT THUS FAR, GIVEN ITS SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES?

2) DO ACCOMPLISHED RESULTS CONCUR WITH THE PROJECT PLAN – OR DEVIATE FROM IT? (IF SO, PLEASE INDICATE POINTS OF DEVIATION).

3) PLEASE IDENTIFY THE MAIN CHALLENGES IN THE PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION:

- i. The project was poorly designed: the specific objectives of the project do not match risk and needs assessment analyses; project activities do not match the specific objectives of the project.
- ii. Lack of capacity for project implementation on the side of the beneficiary.
- iii. Lack of political commitment on the side of beneficiary.
- iv. Lack of focus on project implementation: competing priorities of the beneficiary have stretched its staff to the limit.
- v. Composition of the beneficiary project team is poorly designed and does not match identified project priorities.
- vi. Lack of proper communication between the leadership and the project team of the beneficiary.
- vii. Lack of expertise on the side of CIDS.
- viii. Lack of proper communication with CIDS.
- ix. Lack of financial resources.
- x. Poor allocation of financial resources on the project.
- xi. Other.

4) TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE THE PLANNED ACTIVITIES ON THE PROJECT HAVE BEEN REALIZED?

5) HOW DOES THE BENEFICIARY PLAN TO ENSURE A LONG TERM SUSTANABILITY OF PROJECT RESULTS?

6) HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE COLLABORATION WITH CIDS?

- i. Excellent;
- ii. Good;
- iii. Modest;
- iv. Poor.

7) DOES CIDS PROJECT TEAM HAVE THE NECESSARY EXPERTISE FOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION? ARE THERE ANY GAPS IN THIS RESPECT?

8) ARE THERE ANY SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE THIS COLLABORATION?

9) ARE OTHER LINE MINISTRIES AND STATE INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED IN THE CIDS PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION IN SOME FORM OR FASHION?

10) ARE OTHER DONORS INVOLVED IN THE PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION? IF SO, HOW?

11) IS CIVIL SOCIETY (CSO, ACADEMIC COMMUNITY, MEDIA) INVOLVED IN PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION IN SOME FORM OR FASHION? IF SO, PLEASE DESCRIBE.

12) ARE THE RESULTS OF THE PROJECT COMMUNICATED TO OTHER LINE MINISTRIES AND STATE INSTITUTIONS? IF SO, HOW?

13) ARE PROJECT ACTIVITIES AND RESULTS COMMUNICATED TO THE PUBLIC? IF SO, HOW?

14) WHAT ARE THE MAIN LESSONS LEARNT THUS FAR IN THE PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION?

15) WHAT ARE RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION?

Appendix III: Key Documents Reviewed

Project documentation

- CIDS project documents (BiH, Kosovo, Montenegro);
- CIDS annual project plans;
- CIDS progress reports;
- CIDS functional analyses;
- Evaluations of CIDS seminars, workshops and conferences.
- Various correspondence and documents in project archive provided by NMFA

Other documents:

- Difi analyses of institutional risks in the Southern Europe;
- Integrity plans of the respective MoDs, MMoi, and KMSF;
- Public administration and anti-corruption strategies: BiH, Kosovo, Montenegro;
- EC Enlargement Strategy: 2015.
- EC Progress Report on the Enlargement Strategy 2016.
- EC national progress reports: BiH, Kosovo, Montenegro 2016;
- IPA indicative strategy papers 2014-2020: BiH, Kosovo, Montenegro

Appendix IV: Terms of Reference for Review

Description of the services required

The review shall assess the preliminary results of project RER-14/0019 in all 4 of the sub-projects/work packages: 2 in Kosovo, 1 in Montenegro and 1 in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The review shall, if possible, identify and describe changes to laws, regulations and administrative routines that are a direct result of the project implementation.

Furthermore, with reference to the DAC review criteria, the following questions should be addressed:

Relevance

- To what extent are the objectives of the project and sub-projects still valid?
- Are the activities and outputs of the sub-projects consistent with the overall goal of the project and the attainment of its objectives?
- Are the activities and outputs of the sub-projects consistent with the intended impacts and effects?

Effectiveness

- To what extent were the objectives achieved/are likely to be achieved?
- What are/were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?

Efficiency

- Are/were activities cost-efficient?
- Are/were the objectives achieved on time?
- Were/are the projects implemented in the most efficient way compared to alternatives?

Impact

- What has happened as a result of the sub-projects?
- What real difference has the activity made to the beneficiaries?
- How many people have been affected?

Sustainability

- To what extent will the benefits of the sub-projects continue after donor funding cease?
- What were/are the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of sustainability of the sub-projects?

Improvements may not occur until after the project period has expired and the projects are part of the broader efforts by the international community. These factors need to be taken into consideration when reviewing the projects.

Background:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs entered 7 December 2015 into a three-year agreement with the Ministry of Defence of up to NOK 18 million to build integrity in the defence sector in Bosnia-Herzegovina and

Montenegro and the security sector in Kosovo. The agreement builds on previously conducted assessments and analyses.

The overall goal of the project is to strengthen integrity and reduce vulnerability to corruption in the defence and security sectors. More precisely, the project aims at improving administrative routines and regulations, increase openness, reduce vulnerability to conflicts of interests, establish better systems for risk assessments, and build competence and capacity among civil servants.

The 4 sub-projects of RER-14/0019 are the following:

Kosovo 1: Strengthening the integrity framework in the Ministry of Kosovo Security Forces.

Kosovo 2: Support to capacity development in the Ministry of Kosovo Security Forces.

Montenegro: Strengthening the integrity framework in security and defence sectors.

Bosnia-Herzegovina: Support to the procurement system in the Ministry of Defence.

Deliverables:

The consultant must deliver – in English and in writing - an inception report, a draft report and a final report. The final report must not exceed 30 pages, incl. the summary.

In undertaking the consultancy assignment, the review team shall employ the following methodology, to which they are invited to add complementary elements:

- Desk study of relevant background documents.
- Field visits to all three countries and their Ministries of Defence/Security
- Interview with key personnel in Norway, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro, incl. Ministry of Defence in Oslo.
- Interviews with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo and the Norwegian embassies in Pristina, Beograd and Sarajevo

Time frame

Inception report: Within 2 weeks of signing of contract

Draft report: 10 October 2017

Final report. 30 October 2017